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I. INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
of 1969 (Coal Act),' federal law added a new dimension to labor
relations at mining operations. Section 103(h) of the Coal Act provided
that "the authorized representative of the miners at the mine" shall be
given an opportunity to accompany a federal inspector 'on any inspec-
tion of the mine. Eight years later, in section 103(f) of the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act),2 Congress enlarged
the role of this "walkaround" representative, giving him the right "to
participate in pre- and post-inspection conferences held at the mine,"
and guaranteeing him compensation for "lost work time during the
inspection.",3 The Mine Act also authorized the use of multiple compa-
ny and miner representatives if the inspector determined that "more
1. Pub L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969) (previously codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-
960 (1976)).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.
§§ 801-962 (1988)).
3. 30 U.S.C. § 813(f) (1988).
[Vol. 95:617
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than one representative from each party would further aid the inspec-
tion."
4
The policies underlying these provisions are clear enough. Con-
gress hoped to encourage greater participation by miners in health and
safety matters arid, thus, to increase their understanding of the require-
ments of the law and their awareness of conditions and problems in
the mine.5 In Congress' view, including a representative of miners in
the inspection party would enhance the overall safe operation of the
mine because "if the worker is along, he knows a lot about the pre-
mises upon which he works and, therefore, the inspection can be much
more thorough."
6
Who can be a "representative of miners," and how is he to be
chosen? Despite the importance that Congress attached to the position,
neither statute defined the term nor established procedures for selec-
tion, but left those details to the administrative agencies-under the
Mine Act, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) of the
United States Department of Labor, and, formerly, under the Coal Act,
the Bureau of Mines and the Mining Enforcement and Safety Adminis-
tration of the United States Department of the Interior.7 MSHA, like
the Interior Department before it, interprets the term broadly, defining
"representative of miners" as "[a]ny person or organization which
represents two or more miners."8 Similarly, MSHA's procedures for
designating a representative impose few restrictions, requiring only that
the designee provide MSHA and the operator with certain information
concerning the nature and scope of his authority.9
If Congress had legislated on a blank slate when it created these
entitlements, the open approach of the regulations may not have be-
come problematic. However, as Congress recognized during debate on
the Coal Act, mining was traditionally a unionized industry.10 Under
4. Id
5. S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3401, 3428.
6. 123 CONG. REC. 20,020 (June 21, 1977) (statement of Sen. Javits).
7. MSHA's regulations appear at 30 C.F.R. Part 40 (1991).
8. 30 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
9. 30 C.F.R. §§ 40.2, 40.3 (1991).
10. 115 CONG. REc. 27,288 (Sept. 26, 1969) (statement of Sen. Metcalf) ("Most of
19931
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the National Labor Relations Act (Labor Act or NLRA)," miners at
many operations had already selected a union, usually the United Mine
Workers of America (UMWA) in the coal fields, as their exclusive
representative for dealing with the operator over "terms and conditions
of employment," which by law included workplace safety and
health.12 Without accommodation between the two laws, MSHA's reg-
ulatory scheme of multiple, minority-based representation and com-
pelled admission tomine property inevitably has created a fundamental
conflict with the NLRA's principle of exclusive representation through
majority vote of the employees, 13 the attendant rights that flow to
employers and employees under that Act, 4 and, in particular, federal
labor law's longstanding recognition and preservation of the employer's
private property rights. 5
MSHA has made no such accommodations. During rulemaking in
1978, it brushed aside, as premature or unfounded, comments noting
the significance of the term "representative" under federal labor law
and seeking a more precise administrative definition of the Mine Act's
terminology. "[P]roblems are not anticipated with this broad interpreta-
tion of the term representative of miners," the agency assured the
public; "[i]f problems do arise MSHA will propose appropriate revi-
sions."' 6
Problems now have arisen, yet MSHA's regulations and policies
remain unchanged. The problems are epitomized in Kerr-McGee Coal
Corp.,7 which was recently decided by the Federal Mine Safety and
these mines are under the jurisdiction of the United Mine Workers").
11. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169) (1988)) (also
known as the Wagner Act) was amended by the Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (also known as Taft-Hartley), by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo-
sure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (also known as the Landrum-Griffin), and by other minor
enactments. References in this article are to the statutory sections of the NLRA, as amend-
ed.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); see Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLR]B, 379
U.S. 203, 217 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); Gulf Power Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 622 (1966),
enforced, 384 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159(a) (1988).
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1988).
15. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 845-47 (1992).
16. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,508 (1978).
17. 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1889 (AL 1991), aff'd, 15 F.M.S.H.RIC. 352 (1993), petition for
[Vol. 95:617620
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Health Review Commission (Commission). In Kerr-McGee, the Com-
mission affirmed the holding of an administrative law judge (ALT) that
the operator of a nonunion mine which the UMWA was attempting to
organize violated section 40.4 of MSHA's regulations" by refusing to
post the name of a nonemployee union organizer as a representative of
miners at the mine. The operator argued, inter alia, that the compelled
posting of the information and admittance of the organizer to mine
property created an unnecessary and impermissible conflict between
MSHA's regulations and the NLRA's scheme of employer and em-
ployee rights.' 9 The judge disagreed, and the Commission affirmed.
The judge noted that the Mine Act and its regulations place no limits
on who may be chosen as the miners' walkaround representative and
found no evidence that the union had abused the walkaround privilege.
Further, he found no basis to conclude that the designation of a union
organizer as a representative of miners was a per se abuse of the Mine
Act, irrespective of what the NLRA might require.2 °
This Article examines the interplay of the NLRA and the Mine
Act, with particular focus on problems that arise when miners desig-
nate, and the operator is required to recognize and to admit onto mine
property, a nonemployee union representative as a representative of
miners under the Mine Act. We first review the principles of majority
rule and exclusive representation which underlie the NLRA and explain
how those principles, which are designed to protect the employees'
free choice in matters of collective bargaining, are carefully balanced
with other rights which the NLRA confers or preserves, such as the
private property rights of employers.
We then analyze the language and legislative and administrative
histories of the statutory provisions and implementing regulations con-
review docketed, No. 93-1250 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 1, 1993).
18. Section 40.4 provides:
A copy of the information provided the operator (concerning the identity and
scope of authority of the designated representative of miners] shall be posted upon
receipt by the operator on the mine bulletin board and maintained in a current
status.
30 C.F.R. § 40.4 (1991).
19. See Kerr-McGee, 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1891.
20. IM. at 1904-05.
19931
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cerning representatives of miners under the Coal Act and Mine Act.
We demonstrate that in both statutes, Congress consciously legislated
against 'the backdrop of a predominantly unionized industry. In so
doing, Congress pursued the dual objectives of providing representation
for miners at all mines, whether unionized or not, and enhancing fed-
eral mine inspections by including on the inspection team an individual
with an employee's perspective and knowledge of day-to-day condi-
tions in the mine. We also demonstrate that in implementing the statu-
tory provisions through regulations, the agencies-particularly MSHA-
have strayed from Congress' intent by adopting an excessively open
policy for designating and recognizing miners' representatives, at the
expense of employers' and miners' rights under the NLRA, and at the
further expense of the benefits that Congress intended to flow from
employee participation in federal safety and health inspections of their
workplace. We conclude that the purposes of the NLRA and the Mine
Act can best be achieved, and the conduct of the parties most appro-
priately affected, by harmonizing the two statutes rather than interpret-
ing the Mine Act in isolation.
II. EMPLOYEES' AND EMPLOYERS' RIGHTS UNDER THE NLRA
A. Employees' Right to Majority-Based Representation
The overall goal of the NLRA is to eliminate impediments to the
free flow of commerce by "encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representa-
tives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protec-
tion."21 Significantly, Congress chose only to encourage collective
bargaining, not to require it, for to do otherwise would be to deprive
employees of the very right to self-determination and workplace de-
mocracy that Congress sought to protect. Thus, the basic right protect-
ed by the NLRA is the right to choose, not merely between one or
21. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
[Vol. 95:617
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another collective bargaining representative, but whether to be repre-
sented at all. As section 7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ....'
While Congress sought to safeguard the right to join together for "mu-
tual aid or protection," it placed an even greater premium on ensuring
the employee's right to choose whether to exercise those rights.23
With particular reference to section 7, the Supreme Court recently
noted that "the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions
or their nonemployee organizers."24 Those rights are safeguarded dur-
ing the selection of a collective bargaining representative by section 9
of the NLRA,'5 which creates an elaborate procedural mechanism and
requires that a collective bargaining representative be selected by a
majority of the employees in an appropriate unit.26 Once selected by
22. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (emphasis added).
23. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 318 (1985) (explaining
that section 7 was being amended so that the "[National Labor Relations] Board will be
prevented from compelling employees to exercise such rights against their will, as it has
consistently done in the past"); see also Pattern Makers' League of North America v.
NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 100 (1985) (noting that section 7 of the NLRA "grants employees the
right 'refrain from any or all [concerted] . . .activities'").
24. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 845 (1992).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1988).
26. Section 9(a) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment: Provide4 That any individual employee or group
of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their em-
ployer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bar-
gaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent, with the terms
of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided firther,
That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such
adjustment.
19931
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such a majority, the representative becomes the sole representative of
the employees. An employer violates the rights of its employees who
have selected an exclusive collective bargaining representative if it
negotiates or "deals with" any other person or entity as a "representa-
tive" of the bargaining unit.'
Although an employer can voluntarily recognize an employee
representative based on a showing of majority support, the employer
has the right to refuse recognition and to require the representative to
prove its majority support through a secret-ballot election supervised
by the National Labor Relations Board (Board or NLRB).28 The
Board strives to ensure "laboratory- conditions" for the elections it
conducts so that employees are not threatened or induced to vote for
or against union representation.29 To this end, the Board has issued
detailed procedural regulations to govern the determination of who is
eligible to vote and the conduct of the election itself." Laboratory
conditions are violated if an employer "dominate[s] or interfere[s] with
the formation or administration of any labor organization,, 31 or pre-
maturely recognizes a minority union, depriving employees of free
choice.32  Moreover, a Board-supervised election promotes
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
27. The concept of "dealing with" is central to the NLRA's definition of "labor orga-
nization." See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text. The refusal to deal exclusively with
the properly elected majority representative would violate 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988),
which makes it an unfair labor practice for the employer to "refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees." See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 678, 684 (1944) ("[lit is a violation of the essential principle of collective bargaining
and an infringement of the Act for the employer to disregard the bargaining representative
by negotiating with individual employees, whether a majority or a minority, with respect to
wages, hours and working conditions").
28. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1988); see Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB,
419 U.S. 301 (1974).
29. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
30. 29 C.P.R. §§ 102.60-102.151 (1992).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988). This section of the Labor Act was drafted to con-
demn employer recognition of representatives who do not reflect the free wishes of a major-
ity of the employees. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935), enforced, 303
U.S. 261 (1938).
32. Bemhard-Altman Texas Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292 (1960), enforced sub no,,.
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
aft'd, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
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labor-management stability because the statute bars another election for
twelve months following a valid election.33
B. Exclusivity of Representation Under the NLRA
Once a union or other representative 4 is selected by a majority
of the employees, its representation is exclusive. 5 Both union and
employer share a common obligation to bargain collectively in good
faith over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. 3 6 Workplace safety and health constitute such "other terms and
conditions of employment" and must be subjected to good-faith collec-
tive bargaining.37 The justification for according the representative
this privileged status is not to promote the well-being of labor organi-
zations, but rather to further the employees' majority decision to deal
collectively with the employer. To "secure to all members of the unit
the benefits of their collective strength and bargaining power, '138 the
NLRA guarantees that majority can impose its chosen representative on
the minority through the exclusivity provision of section 9(a) and
bargain with the employer to make union membership a condition of
employment.39 In exchange for these privileges, the representative in-
33. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988).
34. Outside the procedural restrictions just discussed, the NLRA places few limitations
on who can serve as a "representative." It can be an individual or a labor organization. 29
U.S.C. § 152(4) (1988). If the latter, it need not have any formal structure or affiliation,
but can be:
[Alny organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation commit-
tee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988) (emphasis added). The determinative, factor is a functional one-
that one of the representative's purposes be to "deal with" employers concerning working
conditions.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
37. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); Gulf Power Co., 156 N.L.R.B. at 625; see supra note 12.
38. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62
(1975).
39. I L (discussing NLRA §§ 7 & 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 & 158(a)(3)). Section
8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in hiring or job
I
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curs a "statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members with-
out hostility or discrimination toward any."4 In this fashion and oth-
ers,4 1 federal labor law "attempt[s] to promote democracy by adjust-
ing conflict between individual employee rights and union collective
ailthority."
42
The consequences that flow from the concept of exclusive,
majority-based representation have been consistently upheld as essential
to the NLRA's scheme for promoting industrial peace despite their
impact on individual freedom of choice. We discuss some of those
consequences in the sections that follow.
1. Subordination of Individual Employee Interests to the
Collective Interest of the Unit
The interests of individual employees, whatever their significance
prior to the selection of a collective bargaining representative, become
tenure on the basis of union membership or affiliation, but states in a proviso that:
"[N]othing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an em-
ployer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition
of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of
such employment . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). The "membership" obligation ex-
tends to payment of dues to cover collective-bargaining costs of the representation. See
Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
40. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); see also Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S.
at 64 ("Congress implicitly imposed upon [the bargaining representative] a duty fairly and in
good faith to represent the interests of minorities within the unit").
41. Additional checks on the exclusive representative's authority include limiting the
authority to the "unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining," Emporium
Capwell, 420 U.S. at 64 (citing Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 171
(1971)), and giving union members quasi-eonsfitutional rights against their unions, including
freedom of speech and assembly and the right to elect union officers by secret ballot at
regular intervals. Id at 64 (discussing Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519
(1959)); see supra note 11.
42. Roger C. Hartley, The Framework of Democracy in Union Government, 32 CATH.
U. L. REV. 13, 18 (1982). As Hartley points out, one impetus behind adoption of the
NLRA was the belief of its sponsor, Senator Wagner, that "Democracy in industry must be
based on the same principles as democracy in government. Majority rule, with all its imper-
fections is the b5st guarantee of workers' rights, just as it is the surest guarantee of politi-
cal liberty that mankind has yet discovered." Id at 43 (quoting 79 CoNG. REc. 7571
(1935)).
626
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subordinate to the collective interest of the group once a majority of
the employees choose to bargain collectively. This principle has been
strongly articulated by the United States Supreme Court ever since its
1944 decision in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB.43 The litigation concerned
the continued validity of individual employment contracts after a ma-
jority of employees voted to be represented by a union.44 The Court
sustained the statutory preference for exclusivity of the majority repre-
sentative and invalidated the prior contracts.45
Under J.L Case Co., individual arrangements between employers
and employees cannot withstand the selection of a majority-based
representative or be used to delay or defeat the procedures prescribed
by the NLRA. Otherwise, "the Act would be reduced to a futility.
46
The Court explained that the very purpose of collective bargaining is
to supplant the terms individual employees might prefer with "terms
which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare
of the group."' 47 Even if separate contracts confer advantages on indi-
vidual employees, the Act's collective bargaining scheme views them
"with suspicion" because:
They are a fruitful way of interfering with organization and choice of
representatives; increased compensation, if individually deserved, is often
earned at the cost of breaking down of some other standard thought to be
for the welfare of the group, and always creates a suspicion of being paid
at the long-range expense of the group as a whole .... The workman is
free, if he values his own bargaining position more than that of the group,
to vote against representation; but the majority rules, and if it collectivizes
the employment bargain, individual advantages or favors will generally in
practice go in as a contribution to the collective result.4"
The Court did not invalidate individual employment contracts altogeth-
er in the collective setting.49 It did, however, underscore the primacy
43. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
44. See hi at 333-34.
45. Id. at 332-39.
46. Id at 337.
47. Id at 338-39.
48. Id at 339.
49. Id ("We know of nothing to prevent the employee's, because he is an employee,
making any contract provided it is not inconsistent with a collective agreement or does not
19931 627
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of exclusivity by stressing that such contracts were impermissible if
they diminished an employer's obligations or increased an employee's
obligations under the collective bargaining agreement."0
2. Accommodating Other Statutorily Protected Interests
Within the NLRA's Framework of Exclusive
Collective Representation
Like the terms of individual employment contracts, rights con-
ferred on employees by other statutes must be harmonized with the
demands of exclusive majority representation under the NLRA. The
Supreme Court's decision in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addi-
tion Community Organization1 illustrates the primacy of exclusive
representation and majority rule in the face of potentially conflicting
policies that Congress advanced in other statutes. In that case, black
employees accused their employer of racial discrimination in violation
of the collective bargaining agreement as well as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.2 The union investigated and confirmed the
employees' allegations and notified the company that it would take the
grievances to arbitration if necessary. The employees, however, felt
that the contractual grievance procedure was inadequate for their alle-
gations of systemic discrimination. They attempted to raise the matter
directly with company officials, demanded the right to bargain for
improvements, and were eventually discharged for picketing in viola-
tion of the contractual no-strike provision. In unfair labor practice
proceedings before the Board, they argued that their discharges violat-
ed the NLRA because they sought to vindicate racial discrimination
and were thus entitled to raise the issue separately with the employer,
"free from the constraints of the exclusivity principle of sec-
tion 9(a).
53
amount to or result from or is not part of an unfair labor practice.").
50. Md.
51. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(1)-(17) (1988).
53. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 65.
[Vol. 95:617
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The Supreme Court disagreed. In an opinion by Justice Marshall,
the Court held that even so important a consideration as the elimina-
tion of racial discrimination in employment, as embedded in another
federal statute, did not justify the employees' departure from the
NLRA's orderly scheme for resolving their dispute with the employer:
[The employees'] argument confuses the employees' substantive right to be
free of racial discrimination with the procedures available under the NLRA
for securing these rights. Whether they are thought to depend upon Title
VII or have an independent source in the NLRA, they cannot be pursued
at the expense of the orderly collective-bargaining process contemplated by
the NLRA?.
The Court explained that the union, as the collective bargaining repre-
sentative of all the employees in the unit, has a legitimate interest in
presenting a united front on this, as on other issues, and in not seeing
its strength dissipated and its stature denigrated by subgroups within
the unit separately pursuing what they see as separate interests.55
Thus, the principle of exclusive majority representation under
section 9 denies any minority group the ability to circumvent the col-
lective bargaining representative and deal directly with the employer,
even when the interest they assert is explicitly and undisputedly pro-
tected by another federal statute.55 In such cases, section 9 has a
drastic, but altogether intended, effect: it "extinguishes the individual
employee's power to order his own relations with his employer" and
gives the bargaining representative "powers comparable to those pos-
sessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of
those whom it represents. 57
54. l at 69.
55. Id. at 70.
56. Section 9(a) permits individual employees or groups of employees to present griev-
ances to their employer and have their grievances adjusted without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, but only if that type of adjustment is not inconsistent with the
collective bargaining agreement, and only if the bargaining representative has an opportunity
to-be present. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
57. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 63 (quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)).
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Employer conduct is also restricted under the mandate of exclusiv-
ity established by section 9(a). Just as the NLRA precludes employees
from circumventing the union, so too it forecloses employers from
avoiding the exclusive representative by dealing with some other repre-
sentative or dealing directly with employees. Because an employer is
obligated under sections 8 and 9(a) to bargain exclusively with the
union, the NLRA "exacts 'the negative duty to treat with no oth-
er.' '5 8 Even if the employees were to consent, an employer cannot,
"by its own actions, disestablish the union as the bargaining represen-
tative of the employees, previously designated as such of their own
free will."
59
A further corollary to the principle of exclusive representation is
that the employer cannot, by bypassing the union and dealing directly
with the employees, "create the impression that the employer rather
than the union is the true protector of the employees' interests." 6°
Rather, the employer must at least recognize that "the statutory repre-
sentative is the one with whom it must deal in conducting bargaining
negotiations, and that it can no longer bargain directly or indirectly
with the employees.'
3. Consequences for the Nonorganized Workplace
The NLRA and the cases just discussed demonstrate that the prin-
ciples of majority rule and exclusive representation permeate labor
relations in the organized workplace. These principles also, however,
affect employer, union, and employee conduct even if the employees
have not (or have not yet) selected a collective bargaining represen-
tative. In those circumstances, the principles work by negative implica-
tion to bar an employer from treating any representative as the statuto-
ry representative of the employees.
58. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1944) (quoting NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44 (1937)).
59. Id. at 687 (quoting NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318, 339 (1940))."
60. General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 195 (1964), enforced sub nora. NLRB v.
General Electric Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
61. Id. at 194.
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In the leading case, Bernhard-Altman Texas Corp.,62 the Board
concluded that an employer and a union violated sections 8(a)(1) and
(2)63 and 8(b)(1)(A)64 of the NLRA through the employer's recogni-
tion of the union as an exclusive bargaining representative, even
though a majority of the employees had not selected the union as a
representative as of the date on which the employer extended recogni-
tion. Neither the company's and union's good faith belief that majority
support existed at that time, nor the fact that the union had acquired
majority support by the time the parties signed a collective bargaining
agreement, was a defense to the charges.6 5
The Supreme Court upheld the Board's conclusion. The Court
explained that whereas the exclusivity provision of section 9(a) "placed
a nonconsenting minority under the bargaining responsibility of an
agency selected by a majority,"'  the reverse was the case here: the
company "granted exclusive bargaining status to an agency selected by
a minority of its employees, thereby impressing that agent upon the
nonconsenting majority." 67 The parties' good faith but mistaken belief
that majority support existed at the time of recognition was no de-
fense, because such recognition "would place in permissibly careless
employer and union hands the power to completely frustrate employee
realization of the premise of the Act-that its prohibitions will go far
to assure freedom of choice and majority rule in employee selection of
representatives., 61 Moreover, the Court found it inconsequential that
the union may have acquired majority support by the time the parties
62. 122 N.L.R.B. 1289 (1960), enforced sub nom. International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1960), affd, 366 U.S. 731 (1961)
(Bernhard-Altman).
63. Sections 8(a)(1) and (2) make it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "in-
terfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
7" of the Act, and to "dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)-(2)
(1988).
64. Section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to
"restrain or coerce ... employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7" of the
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1988).
65. See Bernhard-Altman, 366 U.S. at 733-35.
66. i at 737 (quoting Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954)).
67. l
68. Id. at 738-39.
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executed the collective bargaining agreement, some forty days after the
company recognized the union. "Indeed," the Court noted, "such acqui-
sition of majority status itself might indicate that the [earlier] recogni-
tion... afforded [the union] a deceptive cloak of authority with
which to persuasively elicit additional employee support"
69
4. Scope of Affected Employer Conduct: "Dealing with"
Employee Representatives
The scope of an employer's interaction with the statutory represen-
tative of the employees depends upon the meaning of the term "deal-
ing with." The NLRA defines the term by implication only, using it to
describe the core function of a labor organization. Under section 2(5),
a "labor organization" is "any organization of any kind ... in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."7
Those seeking a more precise definition must look to the case
law, where the Board and the courts, like the statute itself, have es-
chewed the use of "conventional accoutrements of a labor organiza-
tion-constitution, bylaws, officers, and the like"7 1 -for a functional
definition.72 "Dealing with" encompasses much more than .merely
69. Id. at 736. The NLRA permits an employer to bargain with a minority union only
in the building and construction industry, under a special exemption in section 8(f), 29
U.S.C. § 158(0 (1988). Without the exemption, this common practice in the construction
industry would have been an unfair labor practice, as it was for the company and union in
Bernhard-Altman. See NLRB v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 344 (1978) (citing Bernhard-Altman, 366 U.S. at 737).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988) (emphasis added). "Dealing with" also is the core of
the definition of "labor organization" in section 3(i) of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 402(i) (1988), under which courts have followed a functional
approach similar to the Board's under the NLRA. See Brennan v. UMWA, 475 F.2d 1293,
1296 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
71. General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234 (1977).
72. The only formality that the Board insists upon is the representative nature of the
labor organization's status. "The essence of a labor organization," the Board has explained,
"is a group or person which stands in an agency relationship to a larger body on whose
behalf it is called upon to act." General Foods, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1234. In General Foods,
the Board upheld an ALI's conclusion that work teams, when used in lieu of an assembly
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"bargaining with," as the Supreme Court has made clear. In NLRB v.
Cabot Carbon Co.,73 the Court held that company-dominated employ-
ee committees were "labor organizations" even though they had no
membership requirements, collected no dues, and had no funds of their
own, and even though they did not engage in traditional bargaining,
but only made recommendations which the employer had complete
discretion to accept, modify, or reject. The Court reviewed the legisla-
tive history of section. 2(5), 74 and concluded that Congress, by reject-
ig the more limited term "bargaining collectively" in favor of the
broader term "dealing with," intended to encompass activities such as
making proposals and formulating requests concerning seniority, job
classifications, and the improvement of working conditions.75 The
Board has taken Cabot Cove even further, holding in Thompson Ramo
Woolridge, Inc.76 that an employee committee is a "labor organiza-
tion" even if it does nothing more than forward employee "views" and
individual grievances to the company without any specific recommen-
dations about the action needed to accommodate the views or resolve
the grievances. The Board held that the committee's function as a
conduit for grievances alone rendered it a "labor organization," so that
the company violated section 8(a)(2) by making financial contributions
to the committee and by dominating and interfering with it through
arrangements such as allowing top management representatives to vote
in the election of committee board members.
77
A miners' representative "deals with" a mine operator on safety
and health issues and, by so doing, becomes the functional equivalent
of a labor organization. The UMWA describes the duties of the
walkaround representative as "assist[ing] MSHA and the miners who
have selected him in enforcing the statutory and regulatory safety and
health standards"78-that is, "safety rules and practices" in the mine
line, did not constitute "labor organizations," because otherwise every bargaining unit,
"viewed as a 'committee of the whole,'" would be accorded de facto labor organization
status. Id
73. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
74. See idl at 210-12.
75. Id. at 210-14.
76. 132 N.L.R.B. 993 (1961).
77. I. at 994-95.
78. Secretary of Labor ex reL Barry Mylan v. Benjamin Coal Co., 9 F.M.S.H.R.C. 27,
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which are 'otherwise mandatory subjects of bargaining.79 Throughout
an inspection-and all pre- and post-inspection meetings, as well as
accident investigations and the like-the operator, the inspector, and
the miners' representative constantly "deal with" each other on "condi-
tions of employment 8 ° through discussion, debate, compromise, and
correction. Affording an organizer such prominence in the lives of
employees who have not selected a representative through majority
choice is contrary to the policies of the NLRA.
C. Preservation of the Employer's Property Rights Under the NLRA
Union organizing campaigns, like the designation of a representa-
tive of miners to accompany a federal inspector wherever he goes
during his inspection, implicate the private property rights of the mine
operator." A union seeking to organize a work force can gain a con-
siderable advantage if it can enter onto mine property and communi-
cate with the miners there, rather than wait until they leave the mine
and disperse at the end of a shift. But section 7 of the NLRA confers
its rights on employees, not on unions,8 2 so the crucial question is
whether the employee rights are sufficient to obligate the company to
waive its private property rights and admit union organizers onto com-
pany property:
46 (AJ 1987).
79. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
81. A representative of miners gains far more than physical access to the mine site.
He also acquires substantial informational and participational rights. The representative stands
in a privileged position to participate as a full-fledged party in all proceedings before the
Commission and in petition for modification proceedings. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 811(c), 815(d),
817(e)(1) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 2700.4(a)-(b) (1991). The representative must also be given
access to mine maps and the roof control plan at underground mines and must receive a
copy, with opportunity to comment, of the mine's training plan. 30 C.F.R. §§ 48.3, 48.23,
75.200, 75.1203 (1991). In addition, the representative has the legal authority to initiate
formal review proceedings of various types before the Commission and the Secretary. See,
e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 811(c), 815(d), 817(e)(1) (1988). A union's access to company informa-
tion during an organizing drive can be particularly inequitable to the employer because the
union might obtain covert discovery if the organizing campaign leads to litigation before the
NLRB, an agency that does not provide for discovery.
82. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 845 (1992).
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This is not a problem of always open or always closed doors for
union organization on company property. Organization rights are granted to
workers by the same authority, the National Government, that preserves
property rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as
little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.
The employer may not affirmatively interfere with organization; the union
may not always insist that the employer aid organization. 3
The case law concerning union access to company property is
extensive and varied, not only because of the fact-sensitive nature
of the determination,85 but also because the issue can arise in a vari-
ety of substantive and procedural contexts16 and become interwoven
with considerations of judicial deference to the Board's interpretation
of the statute.87 A common thread running throughout the cases, how-
83. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
84. See generally 1 PATRICK HARDIN Er AL., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 87-107
(3d ed. 1992).
85. The Board has stated that "as with other legal questions involving multiple factors,
the 'nature of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations, inevitably involves
an evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive formula as a com-
prehensive answer."' Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 14 (1988) (quoting Electrical Workers
Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961)).
86. For example, the union can raise the issue in an unfair labor practice proceeding
before the Board by alleging interference with section 7 rights in violation of section 8(a)(1)
of the NLRA. See Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112. The employer could sue for injunc-
tive relief in state court for violation of its property rights-a type of action which, when
first brought, raised the further question of whether the NLRA preempted state law. See
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180
(1978) (finding no preemption). The issue has also been decided in the context of First
Amendment challenges to an employer's restriction on the use of its quasi-public property at
workplaces such as stores and shopping malls. See Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407
U.S. 539 (1972); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). And, as the pending action
before the D.C. Circuit illustrates, the issue can arise in litigation uhder the Mine Act as an
employer's defense to MSHA citations because of its refusal to recognize a nonemployee as
a representative of miners. See Kerr-McGee, 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1889 (ALJ 1991), aft'd, 15
F.M.S.H.R.C. 352 (1993), petition for review docketed, No. 93-1250 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 1,
1993); see also Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 897 F.2d 447 (10th Cir.
1990); Mid-Continent Resources, Inc., 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. 881, 883 (ALJ 1988), aft'd, 12
F.M.S.H.R.C. 949 (1990); Secretary of Labor ex rel. Barry Mylan v. Benjamin Coal Co., 9
F.M.S.H.R.C. 27, 36-37 (AIU 1987).
87. The Board's claim to absolute deference was rejected in Lechmere, where the
Supreme Court held that as to nonemployees' access to company property, the meaning of
section 7 was clear, so that (1) courts need not defer to the Board's interpretation, and (2),
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ever, is the distinction between employees and nonemployees, which,
as the Supreme Court recently reaffrmned, is a distinction "of sub-
stance.""8 The Court explained that in cases involving employee ac-
cess to company property to engage in organizing activities, the Board
can appropriately balance the employee's interest in receiving informa-
tion about self-organization on company property from fellow employ-
ees against the employer's right to control the use of his property. 9
But nonemployees receive far less protection from the NLRA: "Section
7 simply does not protect nonemployee union organizers except in the
rare case where the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the
reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them
through the usual channels."' ° The Court held that the exception was
narrow, and that the union's burden of establishing it was "a heavy
one": [The exception] does not apply wherever nontrespassory access
to employees may be cumbersome or less-than-ideally effective, but
only where the location of a plant and the living quarters of the em-
ployees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union
efforts to communicate with them."91
The enormity of this burden gives a union a powerful incentive to
gain access to employees and legitimize its presence on company
property through means other than the section 7 exception. In the
mining industry, one of the union's chosen vehicles is the miners'
representative provisions of the Mine Act and their -implementing regu-
lations, to which we now turn.
to the contrary, the Board must conform to the Supreme Court's interpretation under the
doctrine of stare decisis. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 847-48 (1992) (citing
Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2768 (1990)).
88. IM at 848 (quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113).
89. Id. at 848.
90. Id. at 848 (quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112) (emphasis in original).
91. IM at 849 (quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113) (emphasis added by
Court). The Court gave three "classic examples" of the exception-logging camps, mining
camps, and mountain resort hotels. These examples make clear that both the work site and
the living quarters must be beyond the union's reasonable reach before the employer can be
required to admit nonemployees onto company property. The Court further confirmed the
conjunctive nature of these factors when it held that because the employees in Lechmere did
not reside on the company's property, they were "presumptively not 'beyond the reach' of
the union's message." Id at 849 (citation omitted).
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III. MINERS' RIGHTS TO WALKAROUND REPRESENTATION
A. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
The miners' entitlement to walkaround representation originated in
section 103(h) of the Coal Act, which provided: "At the commence-
ment of any inspection of a coal mine by an authorized representative
of the Secretary, the authorized representative of the miners at the
mine at the time of such inspection shall be given an opportunity to
accompany the authorized representative of the Secretary on such in-
spection.' 92 This provision was not part of the legislation as original-
ly introduced in the Senate or reported out of committee, but was
added as a floor amendment.9 3 The Senate debate reveals that the
provision was not written on a blank slate, but against the recognized
backdrop of a predominantly unionized industry. Senator Metcalf, the
amendment's sponsor, explained:
Mhe whole purpose of the amendment is to provide that when the repre-
sentative of the Secretary, the mine inspector, goes into the mine and
makes an inspection, some member of the union, or, if there is not a un-
ion, some worker be authorized to accompany the inspector to see what he
has inspected and to report back to the miners. 4
Senator Williams likewise noted that "[m]ost of these mines [were]
under the jurisdiction of the United Mine Workers" and that the
amendment would ensure miner representation on inspections of those
mines as well as nonunionized operations.95 The language of Senator
92. 30 U.S.C. § 813(h) (1976).
93. Section 103 of the Coal Act was originally section 301 of the Senate bill, S.
2917. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBIC
WELFARE, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969 (Public Law 91-173) 83-88 (reprinting S. 2917, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969) (section 301 as introduced and reported) (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter 1969 Legis-
lative History]; see also id. at 235-37 (reprinting 115 CONG. REC. 26,478 (Sept. 22, 1969)
(introduction of amendment by Sen. Metcalf)); id at 392-94 (reprinting 115 CONG. REC.
27,287-88 (Sept. 26, 1969) (debate and agreement on proposed amendment)); id. at 871 (S.
2917, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) § 301G) (as passed by the Senate)).
94. 115 CONG. REC. 27,287 (Sept. 26, 1969) (emphasis added).
95. Id
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Metcalf's amendment was included in the House bill96 and with only
slight, unexplained change became section 103(h) of the Coal Act.97
The Conference Committee echoed the Senate's concern about
nonunionized mines, pointing out that "'representative of the miners'
includes any individual or organization that represents any group of
miners at a given mine and does not require that the representative be
a recognized representative under other labor laws."
9 8
Thus, although the Coal Act did not require the representative of
miners to be a recognized collective bargaining representative under
the NLRA, Congress was cognizant of federal labor law's general ap-
plicability to mining operations and of the unionized setting in which
the Coal Act would most frequently be applied. Congress also assumed
that the miners' representative, while not in every instance identical to
the union, would be a person or organization that was familiar with
the specific conditions in the mine at the time of the inspection-that
is, a miner who worked at the mine. Providing for miner representa-
tion was not the end in itself, but a means of assuring a thorough and
accurate inspection. Conditions at the mine would be brought to the
attention of the inspector through the participation of the persons most
familiar with those conditions-the operator of the mine and the min-
ers who worked there:
MR. WILLIAMS of New Jersey: .... I would suggest that no peo-
ple know the mine that is under inspection as do the mine owner and the
miners themselves. What the amendment would provide would be the op-
portunity for a representative of the men who work in that mine, to ac-
company the inspector as he goes through what, for him, could be a new
mine or one that he has not seen in 3 or 4 months. The amendment would
permit the miners to have a representative to go with that inspector.
MR. METCALF: Mr. President, it might well happen that that miner
who has been working in that mine would help the inspector by calling
attention to certain safety violations. He is familiar with the operation of
96. See H.R. 13950, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(h) (1969).
97. The change consisted of deleting the words "if any" from the phrase "the autho-
rized representative, if any, of the miners." The Conference Report gave no reason for the
change. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1969), reprinted in 1969
Legislative History, supra note 93, at 1445, 1511.
98. l at 2582.
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the mine, and he would be able to represent his fellow union members or
his fellow mine workers to reveal safety violations.
MR. WILLIAMS of New Jersey: They would be conditions that
existed. Whether they were violations or not would be the inspector's
conclusions. However, conditions as the miners themselves know them to
exist from day to day in the mines could be pointed out.'
The Interior Department's regulations implementing section 103(h)
of the Coal Act defined "representative of the miners" broadly as "any
person or organization which represents two or more miners at a coal
mine for purposes of the Act."' ° The regulations and the rulemaking
preambles were silent as to the need for the representative to be an
employee of the operator.' The selection process was left largely
undefined, but did permit a collective bargaining representative to
establish itself as a Coal Act representative by filing with the agency
and the operator a "statement that he is the representative of the min-
ers at the mine for purposes of collective bargaining or that he has
written authorization from two or more miners at the mine to represent
them under the Act."'1 2 The agency thus achieved some consonance
between the provisions of the Coal Act and the NLRA concerning
representatives.
Although the legislative history spoke exclusively in terms of a
single representative at a given mine and gave no hint that Congress
contemplated the designation of multiple representatives, °3 the regu-
lations left unclear whether, at a unionized mine, the union would
enjoy exclusive status under the Coal Act. In the preamble to the final
99. 115 CoNG. RiEc. S11,441 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1969) (emphasis added).
100. 30 C.F.R. § 81.1(b) (1977). The regulations were first issued by the Department's
Bureau of Mines. 36 Fed. Reg. 21,405 (1971). They were subsequently transferred to the
Interior Department's Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration when that agency was
created to administer the Coal Act and the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act,
Pub. L. 89-577, 80 Stat. 772 (1966) (previously codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 721-740 (1976)).
See also 38 Fed. Reg. 18,665, 18,668 (1973).
101. See 36 Fed. Reg. 7513 (1971) (notice of proposed rulemaking); 36 Fed. Reg.
21,405 (1971) (final rule).
102. 30 C.F.R. § 81.2(a)(3) (1977).
103. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text; see also 115 CONG. REC. 27,288
(statement of Sen. Metcalf) ("There would automatically be a shop steward or some repre-
sentative of the union present.").
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rule, the agency rejected a comment that since the UMWA was the
collective bargaining representative at "most of the coal mines through-
out the United States on wages, hours, and other conditions of em-
ployment including safety," it "should be recognized as the representa-
tive of miners under the [A]ct."'' 1 4 It is not clear whether the com-
ment was directed at the exclusivity of the union's representation (i.e.,
that NLRA's principle of exclusivity precluded the designation of some
other Coal Act representative besides, or in addition to, the union), or
was an attempt to gain entry to nonunionized mines through regulation
(i.e., that because the UMWA was the collective bargaining representa-
tive at most coal mines for purposes of safety, it should as a matter of
law be made the Coal Act representative at all coal mines). The first
argument would be a valid application of the NLRA's principle of
exclusivity, whereas the second would conflict with principles of em-
ployee choice under both the NLRA and the Coal Act.
B. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977
Section 103(f) of the Mine Act expanded the rights available to a
representative of miners. It provides:
Subject to regulations issued by the Secretary, a representative of the oper-
ator and a representative authorized by his miners shall be given an oppor-
tunity to accompany the Secretary or his authorized representative during
the physical inspection of any coal or other mine ... for the purpose of
aiding such inspection and to participate in pre- or post-inspection confer-
ences held at the mine. Where there is no authorized miner representative,
the Secretary or his authorized representative shall consult with a reason-
able number of miners concerning matters of health and safety in such
mine.
1 5
Section 103(f) further enlarged section 103(h) of the Coal Act by
providing that a miners' representative "who is also an employee of
the operator shall suffer no loss of pay" while participating in the
inspection, and that more than one representative of miners and the
104. 36 Fed. Reg. 21,406 (1971).
105. 30 U.S.C. § 813(f) (1988).
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operator could be used if doing so "would further aid the inspec-
tion."1 06
The legislative history makes clear that although section 103(f) of
the Mine Act contains several new provisions for representatives of
miners, the basis and underlying rationale were still those of sec-
tion 103(h) of the Coal Act. Section 103(f), originally section 104(e)
of the Senate bill, 07 expanded the entitlements available under the
section 103(h) of the Coal Act but was nonetheless "based on" that
earlier provision.0" The House would have retained section 103(h) of
the Coal Act without enlargement. °9 When the Conference Commit-
tee ultimately settled on the Senate version, it did so without explain-
ing its choice, but made clear that it, like Congress when it enacted
the Coal Act, was still mindful of the predominantly unionized setting
to which the provision would apply: The Senate bill required the Sec-
retary to consult with a reasonable number of miners if there was no
authorized representative of miners. The House amendment did not
contain this provision for unorganized miners.11
The legislative history of section 103(f) also makes clear that cen-
tral to Congress' purpose in enhancing the role of the representative of
miners in 1977, just as it was when Congress first provided
walkaround rights in the Coal Act, was the concept of familiarity with
day-to-day conditions in the mine in order to enhance the federal in-
spection. During debate on an amendment by Senator Helms that
would have eliminated the mandatory compensation feature of sec-
tion 103(f), Senator Javits, the ranking minority member of the Senate
Committee on Human Resources and the sponsor of the Senate bill,
stressed that the provision was directed at enhancing the role of "min-
ers," by which Congress meant "any individual working in a coal or
other mine.""" He explained that the new provisions would provide
for "greater miner participation in health and safety matters," and
106. lit
107. S. 717, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(e) (1977), reprinted in S. REP. No. 181, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1977).
108. S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1977).
109. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 655, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1977).
110. Id (emphasis added).
111. 30 U.S.C. § 802(g) (1988).
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increased "miner awareness of the safety and health problems in the
mine.' "2 He elaborated:
One of the things we found at the hearings, Mr. President, that all the
witnesses agreed to, is that miners' safety consciousness needs to be mate-
rially improved. Indeed, one of the matters which was criticized by the
Comptroller General, was the matter of training miners in sensitivity to
safety and health considerations ....
If miners are going to accompany inspectors, they are going to learn
a lot about mine safety, and that will be helpful to other employees and to
the mine operator.
13
Senator Javits' choice of language reflected Congress' underlying
assumption that the representative of miners would be a miner himself,
and would in fact be an employee of the mine who could educate
"other employees" about what he had learned from exercising his
walkaround rights. As the Senator explained, in words reminiscent of
the debate on the Coal Act in 1969:114
[Mf the worker is along he knows a lot about the premises upon which he
works and, therefore, the inspection can be much more thorough ....
It seems such a standard business practice that is involved here, and
such an element of excellent employee relations, and such an assist [sic] to
have a worker who really knows the mine property go around with an
inspector in terms of contributing to the health and safety of the opera-
tion .... 11s
Senator Javits' statements confirmed that familiarity with conditions at
the mine was not merely a desirable attribute, but was the essence of
the. walkaround function.
When the Mine Act took effect on March 9, 1978, MSHA ap-
peared to make the same assumption. The agency stated in an Inter-
pretative Bulletin that "participation in the inspection process by repre-
sentatives of miners will directly aid the inspection itself by providing
112. 123 CoNG. REC. 26,019 (1977) (emphasis added).
113. Id (emphasis added).
114. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
115. 123 CoNG. REc. 26,019 (1977) (emphasis added).
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information through individuals familiar with day-to-day conditions at
the mine site.' ' 116 No such qualification, however, appeared in
MSHA's regulations, which the agency had proposed before issuing the
Interpretative Bulletin but did not issue in final form until after-
wards.117 Rather, MSHA's regulations defined "representative of min-
ers" virtually without limitation, as "[a]ny person or organization
which represents two or more miners at a coal or other mine for pur-
poses of the [A]ct.""" Moreover, unlike the Interior Department's
regulations, which reflected some accommodation to the NLRA by al-
lowing a Coal Act miners' representative to prove his status by filing
a statement that he was the miners' collective bargaining representa-
tive,119 MSHA's regulations entirely dropped the use of collective
bargaining representative status as evidence of a -representative's au-
thority under the Mine Act.
1 20
Commenters on the proposed rule criticized the definition as over-
ly broad and likely to create confusion among miners, and they sug-
gested that the definition of representative under the NLRA be applied,
or at least that the Mine Act representative be elected by a majority of
the miners and be a miner from the work force.121 In its wholesale
rejection of these comments, MSHA asserted that a broad defition
advanced the legislative goal of having miners "freely participate in
health and safety matters" and was justified because of the frequent
use of the term "representative" in different contexts throughout the
Mine Act. 122 MSHA also opined that a more restrictive rule "would
be intrusive into labor-management relations" and would be difficult to
formulate because of variations among mines in terms of size, union-
ized status, and type of product mined.123 It rejected the use of the
NLRA definition of "representative," asserting without elaboration that
116. 43 Fed. Reg. 17,546 (1978) (emphasis added).
117. See 43 Fed. Reg. 9108 (1978) (proposed rule); 43 Fed. Reg. 29,508 (1978) (final
rule).
118. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,509 (1978) (promulgating 30 C.F.R. § 40.1(b)(1)).
119. 30 C.F.R. § 81.2(a)(3) (1977).
120. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,505 (1978) (promulgating 30 C.F.R. § 40.3(a)(4)).
121. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,509 (1978).
122. lId at 29,508.
123. Id.
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"[t]he meaning of the word representative under this act is completely
different" and that the rights of nonunion miners would be "severely
limited" if such a definition were used.124 MSHA also rejected the
use of a majority rule concept because majority rule under the NLRA
contemplates only one representative whereas, in MSHA's view, the
Mine Act's purposes were better served by allowing the designation of
multiple representatives. Lastly, in addressing the comment that the
miners' representative should be a qualified miner from the work
force, MSHA stated that it anticipated no problems with its broad
interpretation because miners could reasonably be expected to "choose
representatives with a substantial amount of experience.
" 12
IV. PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
A. MSIA 's Problematic Rationale
Experience at the juncture of the NLRA and the Mine Act has
borne out the commenters' fears, not MSHA's rosy vision. In recent
years, the UMWA has begun to use the rights granted to the miners'
representatives to advance its interests as a collective-bargaining repre-
sentative without the limitations imposed by the NLRA, the law which
governs collective bargaining. The problems are rooted in MSHA's
broad-brush rejection of public comments during rulemaking. MSHA
seemed on the right track in its Interpretative Bulletin, which ostensi-
bly recognized two factors which would advance Mine Act enforce-
ment without entangling that enforcement with actions which contra-
vene the NLRA: The representative's familiarity with the "day-to-day
conditions at the mine. site"126 and the need for his physical presence
on private mine property during the inspection.127 As a practical mat-
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 43' Fed. Reg. 17,546 (1978).
127. The Interpretative Bulletin used the inspector's and representative's physical pres-
ence on mine property as the principal touchstone for defining the types of activities which
give rise to the representative's participation rights. See 43 Fed. Reg. 17,547 (1978) ("sec-
tion 103(f) contemplates activities where the inspector is present for purposes of physically
observing or monitoring safety and health conditions as part of a direct enforcement activi-
ty") (emphasis added).
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ter, the first consideration would almost certainly have required that
the representative come from the work force at the mine, and the sec-
ond would have allowed an operator to bar the use of outside strang-
ers, whom the operator could exclude from mine property as trespass-
ers.
Neither of these elements, however, survived the transition from
Interpretative Bulletin to final rule, where MSHA eschewed them with
generalizations that avoided, rather than addressed, the potential prob-
lems posed by its inclusive approach to Mine Act representation. For
example, MSHA stated that "representative" under the Mine Act has a
"completely different" meaning from the Labor Acf definition,12 8 but
never explained why-a significant omission, given that under the
NLRA, safety and health issues are not "completely different" from
other labor-management issues and by law are the exclusive province
of the collective bargaining representative and the employer, who have
a mandatory obligation to "deal with" one another about such is-
sues." 9 In addition, MSHA asserted that the legislative history of the
Mine Act contained "no clear statement" of who is qualified to be a
representative,13 ° but ignored the Conference Committee's assumption
that a majority-based union would fulfill that role in organized
mines.13' MSHA also rejected the NLRA's concept of majority rule
because the purposes of the Mine Act "were better served by allowing
multiple representatives,"'3 but never explained its questionable (and
unarticulated) assumption that a majority was less capable than a mi-
nority of selecting more than one Mine Act representative. 3 3 And in
explaining why the representative need not be an employee of the
128. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,508 (1978).
129. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
130. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,508 (1978).
131. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 655, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1977).
132. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,508 (1978).
133. Within the union's organizational context, for example, the employees could still
designate multiple union officials, provided each was identified in the designation forms
filed with MSHA and the operator. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor,
897 F.2d 447, 455 (loth Cir. 1990). Given the unannounced nature of MSHA inspections,
the designation of multiple representatives may be the only practical way for miners at a
multi-shift operation to ensure that their representatives would be available whenever an
inspector showed up for an inspection.
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mine, MSHA completely sidestepped the issue of familiarity with
day-to-day conditions in the mine.134 It also failed to explain why,
under Congress' virtually identical employee representative authoriza-
tion in the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act),13 the
Secretary of Labor (who administers both the OSH Act and the Mine
Act) required that absent good cause, the employees' representative be
an employee of the employer being inspected.136
For present purposes, the preamble's least satisfactory response to
public comment about the agency's overly broad approach to miner
representation was its unexplained assertion that "any attempt to limit
the manner in which [the Mine Act] representatives are selected would
be intrusive into labor-management relations at the mine and not in
keeping with the spirit of miner participation., 137 In other words,
rather than attempt the difficult task of interpreting and applying the
Mine Act within the context of existing law which imposed its own
obligations, 1 38 MSHA chose to adopt an enforcement scheme which
pretends that the only relevant consideration is the Mine Act. This
blind approach to enforcement was successful only to the point at
which unions, particularly the UMWA, began to use section 103(f) and
MSHA's regulations to advance collective bargaining goals. Mine
operators now find themselves at the mercy of the conflict between the
134. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,508 (1978). MSHA stated only that it was reasonable to expect
miners to choose representatives "wiih a substantial amount of experience." MaL The crucial
point was not, however, that the representative be "experienced," but that he be familiar
with day to day conditions in the mine. See supra notes 92-98, 110-14, and accompanying
text.
135. Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988)) (OSH Act). The OSH Act states:
"Subject to regulations issued by the Secretary, a representative of the employer and a
representative authorized by his employees shall be given an opportunity to accompany the
Secretary or his authorized representative during the physical inspection of any
workplace . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (1988).
136. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.8(c) (1992).
137. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,508 (1978).
138. The NLRA applies to any "industry affecting commerce," which is defined as
"any industry or activity in commerce or in which a labor dispute would burden or obstruct
commerce or tend to burden or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce." 29
U.S.C. § 142(1) (1988).
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two statutes and their policies, with MSHA only too willing to impose
a "waiver" of the operator's NLRA rights.
MSHA's grant of "representative" status to any person or organi-
zation with an authorization from "two or more" miners conflicts with
fundamental principles of the NLRA in several ways:
0 It can require operators to "deal with" a representative (or more than
one) of a minority group of miners despite the presence of an exclusive
representative under the NLRA.
139
9 It can expose operators to potential unfair labor practice charges for
"dealing with" a minority union.'4
* It can require operators to "deal with" a "labor organization," as defined
by the Labor Act, without any of the protections, rights or obligations
established by that law for employees, employers and labor organiza-
tions.
141
e It can effectively void the results of an election conducted by the NLRB
and force a "representative" upon employees even after they have voted to
reject that specific representation.
14
• It directly and dramatically interferes with an operator's legal right to
refuse entry to company property and access to company records to
nonemployees 141even nonemployee union organizers during an organiz-
ing campaign.'"
In contrast, MSHA's laissez-faire approach, although easily rationalized
at the time of rulemaking, failed to account for the realities of the
139. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
140. Bernhard-Altman Texas Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. at 1292; see supra notes 61-68 and
accompanying text.
141. MSHA's regulations permit any two miners to designate any representative they
choose. In addition, miners can obtain independent "safety" representation in contradiction of
NLRA exclusive representation. See 30 C.F.R. § 40.2(b) (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 29,508 (1978)
(discussipg MSHA's preference for "multiple representatives").
142. See Mid-Continent Resources, 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. 881 (1988) (dismissed as moot),
aff'd, 12 F.M.S.H.R.C. 949 (1990); Secretary of Labor ex reL Barry Mylan v. Benjamin
Coal Co., 9 F.M.S.H.R.C. 27 (1987). For a discussion of the issues of statutory conflict
raised by these cases, see Rosemary M. Collyer, Rights of Mine Access to Nonemployee
Representatives of Miners, 11 E. MIN. L. INST. §§ 7.04[1], 7.04[3] (1990).
143. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 897 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1990),
a ffg in part & revg in part Emery Mining Corp., 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. 276 (1988).
144. See discussion of Kerr-McGee, supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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mining workplace and has since created complicated issues for the
Commission and the courts.
B. Problems of Enforcement
1. The Operator's Dilemma
MSHA has not developed a procedure through which an operator
can verify an asserted representative's status or resolve conflicting
claims to representation for the same purposes. As a result, such issues
typically are not raised until the operator incurs a citation for either
failing to post the designation papers, as required by 30 C.F.R. § 40.1,
or refusing to admit the purported representative onto mine property to
accompany an inspector. An operator could seek injunctive relief di-
rectly in district court by raising claims of constitutional violations and
statutory conflict, but the courts are divided as to whether a federal
district court has jurisdiction to hear such claims. 145 Thus, as the law
now stands, an operator's only certain means of adjudicating a chal-
lenge to a purported representative in most jurisdictions is to incur a
citation under the Mine Act, contest it in proceedings before the Com-
mission, and raise the representation challenge as a defense.
146
The absence of any alternative is unsatisfactory for several rea-
sons. First, merely because the operator has a reasonable, good faith
145. Compare Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan, 774 F.2d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 1985),
amended, 781 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1986) (district court has jurisdiction over constitutional
challenges to Mine Act because (1) Act does not expressly deny jurisdiction, (2) constitu-
tional claims are not within the agency's expertise, and (3) such claims concern the Act,
rather than arise under it) and Zeigler Coal Co. v. Marshall, 502 F. Supp. 1326, 1329-30
(S.D. Ill. 1980) (district court has jurisdiction to hear claim that § 105(c) of Mine Act
violates constitutional due process) with Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Martin, 969 F.2d 970
(10th Cir. 1992) (reversing district court's assertion of jurisdiction over constitutional chal-
lenge to designation of union employees as representatives of miners at nonunion mine;
Mine Act does not preclude Commission from considering constitutional claims, and appeal-
ability of Commission decision to court of appeals provides assurance of adequate consider-
ation of constitutional challenges and questions of conflicts with other statutes), cert. grant-
ed, 113 S. CL 1410 (1993).
146. See Thunder Basin, 969 F.2d at 975 ("Operators may not avoid the Mine Act's
administrative review process simply by filing in a district court before actually receiving an
anticipated citation, order, or assessment of penalty").
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disagreement with MSHA's interpretation of the statute, he is forced to
"violate" the law to vindicate his interpretation. Second, an operator
who is cited for such a "violation" must, even before he can litigate
his challenge to it, abate the violation, usually within a very short
time,147 or face further sanctions in the form of a failure-to-abate
order 148 and daily civil penalties until abatement occurs.149 Third, if
the operator abates the violation while proceeding with the administra-
tive appeal process, as the Tenth Circuit has suggested an operator
should do,150 the very harm that the operator sought to avoid-the
infringement of the operator's private property rights and the interfer-
ence with the miners' right to select an exclusive, majority-based bar-
gaining representative-will occur. The union, through the purported
miners' representative, gains ready access to the nonunionized mine
site with a "deceptive cloak of authority with which to persuasively
elicit additional employee support." 1 ' Fourth, instead of obtaining
immediate review of the constitutional challenges and questions of
statutory conflict by a federal court, which is inherently competent to
hear such matters, the operator must take his challenge through two
levels of specialized administrative adjudication before an agency
which, although sometimes willing to entertain these kinds of is-
147. In Kerr-McGee, for example, the operator was given approximately 15 minutes to
post the designation of miners' representative to which it objected. 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. at
1896.
148. 30 U.S.C. § 814(b) (1988).
149. The Mine Act provides for the assessment of a civil penalty of "not more than
$5,000 for each day during which such failure or violation continues." 30 U.S.C. § 820(b)
(1988). In denying an operator the right to seek injunctive relief in district court without
waiting to be cited for an alleged violation, the Tenth Circuit conceded that "[threats of
such penalties in the face of a bona fide interpretive dispute are indeed troubling[,]" but
thought it "questionable that either the Conunission or a court of appeals would sustain a
significant penalty on appeal." Thunder Basin, 969 F.2d at 976. Nevertheless, operators do
face a real threat of daily penalties, which MSHA will use to pressure the operator into
abatement. See Kerr-McGee, 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1900 (MSHA district manager advised
operator of intent to request imposition of daily penalties if operator did not immediately
abate citation by posting contested designation of union organizer as miners' representative
at nonunion mine).
150. Thunder Basin, 969 F.2d at 976.
151. Bernhard-Altman, 366 U.S. at 736.
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sues,"2 has only a limited area of legislatively recognized expertise
which does not extend to such issues.
5 3
2. Nonemployee Miners' Representatives
As the law now stands, a representative of miners need not be an
employee of the mine being inspected, despite the contrary intimations
in the legislative history. The leading case, Utah Power & Light Co. v.
Secretary of Labor,54 involved the designation of a UMWA interna-
tional representative as a representative of miners at a unionized mine.
The UMWA was the certified bargaining representative of the miners,
but the international representative was not an employee of the oper-
ator. The operator argued that nonemployees were ineligible to be min-
ers' representatives under section 103(f) of the Mine Act. MSHA re-
sponded that the definition of "representative of miners" in 30 C.F.R.
§ 40.1 "recognizes that there is no statutory limitation on the miners'
right to choose their representatives." 155 The Commission held that
although the Mine Act's guarantee of miner representation was "not
unqualified," it nonetheless did not authorize the "broad participatory
restriction based on employee status" urged by the operator.15 6 Other-
wise, the Commission held, the miners' right to select representatives
of their own choosing under the Mine Act would be impermissibly
abridged.
5 7
152. See Thunder Basin, 969 F.2d at 974 (collecting cases). The Commission has not
always balked at addressing questions of statutory conflict. See Emery Mining Corp., 10
F.M.S.H.R.C. at 290, but its analysis in Kerr-McGee retreated to the confines of the Mine
Act. See Kerr-McGee, 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 362 ("nothing in the Mine Act or general prin-
ciples of administrative law requires that the Secretary or the Commission defer to or incor-
porate the NLRA").
153. Under the Mine Act, the members of the Commission are to be drawn "from
among persons who by reason of training, education, or experience are qualified to carry
out the functions of the Commission." 30 U.S.C. § 823(a) (1988). The functions are spelled
out in terms of cases and matters "under this Act." 30 U.S.C. § 823(d) (1988).
154. 897 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1988), aff'g in part & rev'g in part Emery Mining
Corp., 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. 276 (1988).
155. Emery Mining Corp., 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. 276, 285 (1988).
156. Id at 284.
157. Id. at 285.
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The Commission also agreed with MSHA that the operator's refus-
al to admit the asserted representative was not excused by the union's
failure to identify the individual by name in the designation forms
filed with MSHA and the operator under 30 C.F.R. §§ 40.2 & 40.3. It
found that because the forms designated the UMWA as the representa-
tive and because it was undisputed that the individual was a valid
international representative of the UMWA, the ALJ had properly con-
cluded that both the union and the individual were miners' representa-
tives.15 The Commission cautioned MSHA, however, that the agency
had pledged to review its regulations if any problems arose,159 and
suggested that the "interests of the mining community and the cause of
cogent enforcement might well be served" by reviewing and clarifying
the filing requirements.
160
The one qualification which the Commission was willing to up-
hold was the operator's policy that the asserted representative, like all
visitors to company property, execute a waiver of liability as a condi-
tion of entry into the mine. 161 The result of this holding, which
placed only a minimal additional burden on the individual, is less sig-
nificant than the Commission's rationale in reaching it. Based on Su-
preme Court precedent in cases involving union access to company
property under the NLRA, the Comnission recognized that "in appro-
priate circumstances conflicts between statutory rights of employees
and private property rights of employers must be resolved by seeking a
proper and balanced accommodation between the two.
1 62
In Utah Power & Light, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
Commission's holding that nonemployees can be miners' representa-
158. I at 287.
159. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
160. Emery, 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 288 (discussing 43 Fed. Reg. 29,508 (1979)).
161. Id at 288-92.
162. Id at 290 (citing Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 318-19 (1979);
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-22 (1976); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
U.S. 105, 112 (1956)). Applying this principle, the Commission found that the operator had
a legitimate and substantial interest in obtaining liability waivers, given the prior cancellation
of its liability insurance following a mine fire, and that this interest overrode the miners'
interest in having their representative accompany the MSHA inspector without executing the
waiver. Ma
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tives, but reversed the Commission's casual approach that had excused
the failure to identify the individual representative on the documents
filed with MSHA and the operator.' 63 The court held that the Mine
Act's guarantee of compensation to a miners' representative who is an
"employee" of the operator "clearly recognized that some miners'
representatives may be employees of the operator and some may
not."' 6  The court acknowledged the operator's concern that
walkaround rights might be abused by nonemployee representatives,
but ruled that an operator could take action against individual instances
of abuse and that "the potential for abuse does not require a construc-
tion of the Act that would exclude nonemployee representatives from
exercising walkaround rights altogether."'165 The court agreed, howev-
er, with the operator's contention that the asserted representative must
comply with MSHA's filing requirements before being entitled to
admittance onto mine property. The court explained that the operator
and the miners must be able to determine "who the miners' representa-
tives are and the scope of their authority" and to ascertain that the
asserted representative is in fact "authorized."'66 The court also noted
that MSHA's interpretation would put the operator in the "untenable
position" of having either to admit a putative "representative" despite
uncertainties about the validity of his status or to risk citation, fines,
and withdrawal orders for failing to permit a valid representative to
accompany an inspector. 67
The decisions made by the court and the Commission create a
tension between the language of section 103(f), which the court found
"clearly" permitted the use of nonemployees as miners' representatives,
and the legislative histories of the Mine Act and the Coal Act, in
which Congress extolled the benefits of the miners' representative in
terms of his familiarity with day-to-day conditions in the mine.168
163. 897 F.2d 447 (loth Cir. 1988). The Commission's ruling concerning the waiver of
liability was not appealed.
164. Id. at 450.
165. Id. at 452.
166. ML at 455.
167. Id. at 455-56. Ironically, these were the same concerns that the Tenth Circuit
would minimize in its decision two years later in Thunder Basin. See supra note 147.
168. See supra notes 92-98, 110-14, and accompanying text.
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The court did not elaborate on what might constitute sufficient "abuse"
to justify an operator's refusal to permit a nonemployee representative
to accompany an inspector.'69 Thus, the decision leaves the operator
room to argue, in a given case, that the designation of a particular
nonemployee as a miners' representative would constitute an "abuse"
of the Act because the nonemployee, unlike the UMWA international
representative in Utah Power & Light,170 knew little or nothing about
conditions in the mine.
By subjecting individual union representatives to the filing require-
ments, moreover, Utah Power & Light addressed one misuse of sec-
tion 103(f) to advance collective bargaining, not safety, interests. Un-
ions will no longer be able to use the sudden designation of multiple
miners' representatives to exact other concessions from an operator, as
the UMWA admittedly did, for example, in The Naaco Mining Co.171
Furthermore, if the representatives are not employees of the operator,
they must comply with an operator's nondiscriminatory requirement
that outsiders execute a waiver of liability as a condition of entering
company property. Presumably, the operator could impose other condi-
tions, as long as they are nondiscriminatory and survive the balancing
test that the Commission applied in Utah Power & Light.'72
169. Utah Power & Light, 897 F.2d at 452.
170. The representative's duties for the union consisted primarily of investigating mine
accidents. He had twice participated in underground investigations at the mine in question,
but had not participated in inspections as a walkaround representative. See Emery, 10
F.M.S.H.R.C. at 280 n.5.
171. 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2734 (1984). In Naaco, the union attempted to put pressure on
the operator in support of a grievance by designating all of the mine's mechanics, and only
mechanics, as the miners' representatives for a shift. The result of the designation, as the
union anticipated, was that mining operations became unsafe and the operator had to curtail
production during inspections requiring multiple miners' representatives. When the operator
refused to recognize the designation of more than one miners' representative per shift from
a single job classification, it was cited for violating section 103(0. The penalty was upheld
despite the union's admission in a settlement agreement that its designation of only mechan-
ics "was made for purposes unrelated to the Act's safety objectives and thereby constituted
an inappropriate exercise of UMWA's designation rights under § 103(0." Id. at 2738. The
AIJ imposed the penalty on the operator under terms of the settlement agreement although
he agreed that the union's tactic "would have curtailed both production and the ability to
operate a safe mine." Id. at 2735.
172. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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Whether the Commission would extend the balancing analysis to
the compelled admission of nonemployee union representatives at
nonunionized mines remained to be seen.173 The court and Commis-
sion were not called upon to reach the issue in Utah Power & Light.
A collective bargaining representative was already in place at the mine;
and the asserted representative was an official of that union, so no
conflict with principles of exclusive representation arose on the facts
of Utah Power & Light. Those issues have arisen in another case,
however, as we explain in the next section.
3. Nonemployee Union Representatives at Nonunionized Mines
The attempted use of nonemployee union representatives at
nonunionized mines squarely presents the conflict between the NLRA's
principles of employee free choice, exclusive representation, and major-
ity rule, and MSHA's inclusive definition of, and procedures for desig-
nating, a representative of miners under the Mine Act. Kerr-McGee
Coal Corp.174 sharpens the issues further because it involves
MSHA's willingness to enforce walkaround rights under the Mine Act
as an aid to a union organizing under the NLRA: the asserted miners'
representative was a professional UMWA organizer who had moved to
Wyoming for the express purpose of unionizing coal miners in the
173. In their dissent in Emery Mining Corp., Commissioners Doyle and Nelson agreed
that labor-relations law requires a balanced accommodation of the employees' rights under
the NLRA and the employer's private property rights. They would have found, however,
that the labor-relations cases were not dispositive, because the Mine Act has an "entirely
discrete purpose" from the NLRA. 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 298 (Doyle & Nelson, Comm'rs,
dissenting) (quoting UMWA v. Peabody Coal Co., 7 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1357, 1365 (1985), aff'd
sub nom. Brock v. Peabody Coal Co., 822 F.2d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). But the Peabody
reasoning is questionable. It suffers from the same flaw as MSHA's assertion that the mean-
ing of "representative" under the Mine Act is "completely different" from its meaning under
the NLRA; upon this basis, without rationale or justification, MSHA seeks to avoid the
exclusivity of the collective bargaining representative's role in dealing with the operator over
all conditions of employment, including job safety and health. See supra notes 128-29 and
accompanying text. Other federal statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, have an
"entirely discrete purpose" from the NLRA, yet their purpose must be accommodated within
the NLRA's framework of exclusive majority representation. See supra notes 50-55 and
accompanying text. The dissenting Commissioners gave no reasons for treating the Mine Act
any differently.
174. 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 352 (1993), aff'g 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1889 (ALl 1991).
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Powder River Basin, including the miners at Kerr-McGee's Jacobs
Ranch Mine. 175 Seven of those miners designated the organizer as
their representative of miners under the Mine Act, but the operator
refused to post the designation and received a citation followed by a
failure-to-abate order.
176
The operator contested the citation and order. The operator argued
that the union could not validly "represent" miners under the Mine Act
if the union was not their collective bargaining representative under the
NLRA, and that Part 40 of MSHA's regulations created an unneces-
sary and improper conflict between the Mine Act and the NLRA. The
operator further argued that, under Utah Power & Light, it was an
"abuse" of the Mine Act for the union to use Part 40 to facilitate
organizing efforts and for MSHA to enforce Part 40 to require the op-
erator to waive its rights under the NLRA, so that the operator was
justified in taking action against the abuse by refusing to post the
designation.
177
The ALJ upheld the citation and order. He found that the Mine
Act and its regulations imposed "no restrictions or qualifications" on
persons or organizations in what he termed their "inherent right to
serve as representatives of miners.""17 He agreed with MSHA that
the term "representative" has different meanings under the NLRA and
the Mine Act, so that the union did not need to satisfy the former to
qualify as a representative under the latter. Under the NLRA, he rea-
soned, representation is "pervasive" and covers "virtually all aspects"
of the labor-management relationship, whereas under the Mine Act it
serves the more limited purpose of "assisting the mine inspector and
accompanying the inspector to point out any problems tha[t] miners
may have noticed. 1 79 The ALJ also found that the operator had not
shown any instances of "abuse" as contemplated by Utah Power &
Light, and that the operator had failed to show "beyond speculation"
175. Kerr-McGee, 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1895, 1897-98.
176. Id at 1896. The order was a "no area affected" order, meaning that it did not
close or shut down any equipment or area of the mine. lId at 1890 n.2.
177. See id at 1891.
178. Id at 1901.
179. a at 1902 & n.9.
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that the union contemplated misuse of the Part 40 rights by engaging
in organizing activities during the walkaround"'8 The Commission
affirmed, holding that it is the "conduct" of a miners' representative
during the walkaround, not his "motivation" in becoming the miners'
representative, that determines whether abuse has occurred.181
Like MSHA's rulemaking analysis,' the ALJ's and
Commission's attempt to reconcile MSHA's regulations with the prin-
ciples underlying the NLRA failed utterly to resolve the conflict be-
tween them. The ALJ correctly recognized that the representative's
function under the NLRA is "pervasive," but failed to explain why,
given this pervasiveness in all aspects of the labor-management rela-
tionship including job safety, a nonunion operator can be required,
allegedly in the name of exercising "important safety rights" granted
under another Act of Congress,8 3 to violate the NLRA's scheme of
exclusive majority representation by admitting a nonmajority union
organizer onto mine property. This result is contrary to established
precedent' and impermissibly confers an aura of legitimacy on the
organizer's privileged admission onto mine property, which miners
could mistake for the operator's or MSHA's endorsement of the
union's organizing effort.' s In such a case, it is settled law that no
specific "abuse" need be shown because the NLRA flatly prohibits an
employer from conduct that recognizes "an agency selected by a mi-
180. IL at 1905.
181. Kerr-McGee, 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 361.
182. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
183. Kerr-McGee, 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1905.
184. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
185. See Bernhard-Altman, 366 U.S. at 736. Forcing a nonunion operator to admit a
union organizer also undercuts the enforcement scheme of the NLRA. Sections 8(a)(1) and
8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA protect employees from restraint or coercion by employers and
unions; section 8(a)(2) forbids employer domination or interference with formation of a
"labor organization"; section 8(b)(1)(A) also prohibits a union from acting as a party to the
employer's interference with employee rights. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b) (1988). Neither an
employer nor a union can engage in conduct that actively benefits a union (or one potential
representative over another) to the detriment of employee free choice. See, e.g., Ralco Sew-
ing Indus., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 438 (1979) (employer cannot favor preferred union by allow-
ing its organizers onto company property); Ravenswood Elecs. Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. 609
(1977) (same).
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nority of its employees, thereby impressing that agent upon the non-
consenting majority.'
8 6
The Kerr-McGee reasoning is questionable for other reasons as
well. First, it miscast the role of the miners' representative. The ALJ
credited the testimony of MSHA's subdistrict manager that representa-
tives "who would not be familiar with the mine" had been valuable
because of their "knowledge of accidents or accident types or assis-
tance in mine rescue or whatever we're involved in at the time." The
ALJ then uncritically applied this testimony to legitimize the use of
the union organizer as a'miners' representative. 187 However, the leg-
islative history makes it clear that the purpose of the miners' represen-
tative is not to act as a general expert on mine safety and health
(which is MSHA's role, not the representative's), but to ensure that the
inspector would be accompanied by someone who was familiar with
current conditions in the mine. 8' If, as the Utah Power & Light
court suggested,"8 9 an "abuse" of the Mine Act occurs if the repre-
sentative does not fulfill the purposes of section 103(f), then the use of
a representative who, as in Kerr-McGee, was unfamiliar with
day-to-day conditions in the mine would for that reason alone be an
impermissible "abuse." Indeed, the use of such a person instead of an
individual who was familiar with the mine would compromise, not ad-
vance, the cause of mine safety, because it would deprive the inspector
of a legislatively mandated supplemental source of infonnation about
the mine.
Second, Kerr-McGee jettisoned the employer's property rights that
are clearly preserved under the NLRA. Under the rubric of administra-
tive deference, the decision failed to look beyond MSHA's bald asser-
tion "that any person qualified to be on a minesite may act as a
miner's representative" and failed to probe MSHA's question-begging
assumption that the union organizer was indeed "qualified to be on
[the] minesite."' 9 In fact, the organizer was not so qualified because
186. Bernhard-Altman, 366 U.S. at 737; see supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
187. Kerr-McGee, 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1900-01.
188. See supra notes 92-98, 110-14, and accompanying text.
189. Utah Power & Light, 897 F.2d at 452.
190. Kerr-McGee, 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1903.
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federal labor law draws a distinction "of substance" between
employees' and nonemployees' access to company premises and pre-
serves the employer's right to exclude nonemployee union organizers
from company property. 91 Thus, the operator had a legitimate basis
under the NLRA to exclude the organizer along with anyone else who
lacked a right of entry.
Third, the AL's use of the doctrine of administrative deference
failed to recognize the inherent limitations on the extent of deference
to which an agency is entitled. The ALJ correctly noted that deference
can be accorded to reasonable interpretations of the statute by an agen-
cy charged with enforcement."9 However, he only cited the legisla-
tive history's general statement that MSHA's interpretations of the
Mine Act "shall be given weight by both the Commission and the
courts."1 93 He did not consider whether MSHA's interpretations were
"reasonable" in view of Congress' interest in ensuring the
representative's familiarity with current conditions in the mine or in
view of the primacy of exclusive majority representation. Similarly, he
did not consider whether the usual deference to the agency should be
diminished in this instance because the Secretary's interpretation could
compromise miner safety by permitting an inspector to use a miners'
representative who was unfamiliar with the conditions in the mine.1 94
Moreover, the ALJ invoked traditional deference even though MSHA's
interpretation implicated principles developed and rights preserved
under a statute that was beyond MSHA's administrative expertise, the
NLRA. He also failed to consider and apply Supreme Court law recog-
nizing the importance of balancing employee statutory rights and em-
191. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 848 (1992); see supra notes 87-90 and
accompanying text. Such exclusion is the rule except in rare cases. Id. In Kerr-McGee, the
miners were clearly accessible without forced trespass: the UMWA had held meetings with
them, conducted several days of safety training for them, and had obtained seven of their
signatures on miners' representative designation forms. Kerr-McGee, 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. at
1897-98.
192. Kerr-McGee, 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1903 (collecting cases).
193. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1977)).
194. If an agency's interpretation "'frustrates the policy that Congress sought to imple-
ment,' no amount of deference can save it." Water Transp. Ass'n v. ICC, 715 F.2d 581,
592 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984) (quoting Federal Election Comm'n
v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981)) (emphasis added).
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ployer private property rights, even though the Commission itself had
applied the rationale..95
Besides these analytical flaws, Kerr-McGee constitutes bad policy
because it compounds the operator's dilemma. It forces an operator not
only to "violate" the Mine Act and incur a citation if he wants to
adjudicate his challenge to a representative,' 96 but also to meet a
heavy burden of proving abuse by showing nothing less than "misuse
of Part 40 rights by either 'outside' or fifth-column type infiltration of
working areas to enlist members, distribute literature, purloin confiden-
tial [operator] records, etc., under the facade of the Mine Act
walk-around participation." 1" The more subtle (but no less effective)
abuse, carried out by a nonemployee organizer who inherently influ-
ences the collective bargaining choices of nonunion miners because of
his privileged presence on mine property under government coercion,
completely eluded the ALL
V. ACCOMMODATION OF MINE ACT AND
NLRA RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
The conundrum forced on the mining industry by MSHA's en-
forcement of section 103(f) is not necessary and is counterproductive
to miner safety. No one disputes that the miners' representative plays
an important role in the scheme of the Mine Act, and only MSHA
disputes the importance of other statutory rights aid obligations under
the NLRA. The goals of both statutes could be harmonized with care-
ful attention to the purposes of each.
The function of the walkaround representative is to inform the
inspector of conditions in the mine and to educate the miners through
195. See Emery, 10 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 290.
196. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
197. Kerr-McGee, 13 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1905. One assumes that the union itself would
bristle at this burden if a representative from a non-UMWA union attempted to exercise
section 103(f) rights on behalf of a rump group of employees at a UMWA-represented
mine. Any NLRA exclusive representative could complain to the NLRB if an employer
"dealt with" a minority representative on walkaround matters. The tactic would clearly ad-
vance a union "raid" to steal the members of an existing collective bargaining representa-
tive.
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reports to them on inspection activities.19 The Commission should
clarify this function and should also adopt the express Congressional
preference that the section 103(f) representative be an employee of the
mine or at least someone familiar with its day-to-day operation. An
exclusive NLRA representative can properly fulfill this role: the union
representative may himself be an employee and at a minimum would
be someone with the obligation to ensure familiarity with the bargain-
ing unit and its terms and conditions of employment.
Unlike MSHA, the Commission should not ignore or denigrate the
rights and obligations imposed by the NLRA. The fallacy behind
MSHA's current position is best demonstrated by examining its opera-
tion at a unionized, rather than a nonunion mine site: The Secretary's
argument would have the effect of authorizing (indeed, requiring) a
mine operator to deal with a stranger as representative of his miners
even if the employees are otherwise represented by a union. Under
MSHA's rationale, the exclusivity guaranteed to a majority-based rep-
resentative under the NLRA is for naught on life-and-death safety
issues if any two miners desire to insert their own outside representa-
tive. Emporium Capwell teaches that other federal employment statutes
cannot and do not displace the primacy of the exclusive representative
under the NLRA.199
Obviously, miners can designate one or more employees as their
representatives. Also, a mine operator can voluntarily admit any strang-
er to its private property. But the operator should not be forced-by a
government agency that found it too "difficult" to analyze the is-
sues-to forgo private property rights vis-a-vis a nongovemment agent.
The Commission (or the courts) should interpret the Mine Act in a
way that complements the statutory objectives of the NLRA and re-
quires the admittance of nonemployee representatives only when those
representatives have obtained that status properly. Mine safety would
not suffer, since Congress has directed the inspectorate to talk to the
miners themselves in the absence of a properly authorized represen-
198. See supra notes 92-114 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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tative. Indeed, mine safety would be enhanced by ensuring that repre-
sentatives are familiar with mine conditions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The walkaround conundrum is both easy and necessary to resolve.
It is easy to resolve because the NLRA affirmatively privileges the
operator's right to refuse admittance to a union organizer and Part 40
of MSHA's regulations does not protect such abuse of walkaround
rights to further non-Mine Act goals. Notwithstanding MSHA's regula-
tory "gloss" to section 103(f) of the Mine Act, an operator has a right
under the NLRA to refuse to recognize or deal with a minority "rep-
resentative" and to deny his alleged "right" to accompany an MSHA
inspector on a physical inspection of the mine. A nonemployee
organizer's access to company property has been squarely addressed
and resolved under the NLRA. An operator's private property rights
may be lessened in an organizing campaign only if the miners are
inaccessible to an outside union's reasonable attempts to communicate
with them. No regulatory interpretation from MSHA can turn that
narrow exception into a general rule.
These issues are also necessary to resolve. At present, the industry
finds itself in the untenable position of having to comply with one
statute at the peril of violating another. The cases also implicate the
broader issue of whether an administrative agency, in the guise of
furthering safety and health, can ignore the applicability of NLRA
policies on union organizing and employee representation. This issue
too has been squarely addressed and resolved by the Supreme Court of
the United States. Federal policies cannot be implemented in a manner
that destroys the NLRA's framework of exclusive representation and
majority rule, or conflicts with each employee's right to engage in
concerted activities or to refrain from them. In the wake of Kerr-
McGee, it is now up to the courts to harmonize the interpretation of
the Mine Act with NLRA principles and to curb MSHA's blind en-
forcement policy.
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